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Smith offers the most detail on the lives of Ed, who served in Europe, 
and Gemma. 
 This narrative history, providing insights into how the war af-
fected average people in a typical community, is a welcome addition 
to the growing literature on the U.S. home front in World War II. The 
work lacks notes, so readers cannot always determine where the in-
formation comes from. Smith relies on a limited selection of secondary 
works, used largely as references on military affairs, and does not seek 
to fit his work into the historiographical framework of other home 
front studies. Conspicuously absent from his bibliography are cita-
tions to overviews of the home front, at least one of which, Paul Cas-
dorph’s Let the Good Times Roll: Life at Home in America during World 
War II, uses periodicals in an approach similar to Smith’s. Although 
scholars would prefer more documentation and analysis, readers who 
seek to understand the lives of the generation that fought World War II 
will enjoy this book. 
 
 
An Opportunity Lost: The Truman Administration and the Farm Policy De-
bate, by Virgil W. Dean. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2006. 
xv, 275 pp. Illustrations, notes, bibliography, index. $39.95 cloth. 
Reviewer Richard S. Kirkendall is professor of history emeritus at the Univer-
sity of Washington, Seattle. He has written extensively about American farm 
policy and international politics in the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. 
This book is a welcome addition to the literature on the history of 
American farm policy. It makes a strong argument about the crucial 
significance of the Truman period for that history. It was a time of 
“opportunity lost,” of failure to develop a much needed, new, and 
long-range policy to replace the New Deal program. Established in 
response to the Great Depression, that program had been reshaped 
during World War II into an emphasis on high price supports de-
signed to persuade farmers to meet the heavy wartime demands for 
food and fiber. By the end of the war, Virgil Dean maintains, an “agri-
cultural revolution” was increasing the output of American farmers 
and thereby generating pressure for a new policy, but the political sys-
tem, headed by Harry Truman, failed to produce one.  
 Dean devotes most of his pages to a description and analysis of 
that failure during the years 1947 to 1950. Truman relied heavily on 
his secretaries of agriculture, first Clinton Anderson and then Charles 
Brannan. In 1947 Anderson believed that, because of the agricultural 
revolution, the United States must move away from a policy of sup-
porting prices at high levels and should endorse a “policy of abun-
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dance.” Many farm organizations and farmers’ representatives in Con-
gress agreed, but the high degree of unity broke down in 1948 under 
pressures from election-year politics and from a fear of falling farm 
prices. Instead of something quite new, the legislators extended high 
price supports for a year and put off a new policy of flexible supports, 
linked with changing levels of production, until 1950.  
 After blaming Truman’s and Brannan’s rhetoric in the 1948 cam-
paign for the rise of partisanship in farm politics, Dean moves on to an 
extended discussion of a plan Secretary Brannan introduced in 1949. 
He favored a continuation of price supports for some commodities, 
“production payments” (government subsidies) rather than high 
prices for producers of commodities that could not be stored for long 
periods, and a way of limiting the amount of money individual farm-
ers could receive from the programs so that they would not encourage 
large operators to enlarge their farms still more. Highly controversial, 
Brannan’s plan generated much debate in the press, within farm orga-
nizations, and among economists. It failed in Congress in 1949. Dean 
attributes that failure mostly to partisanship among both Democrats 
and Republicans; he also gives some credit to the southern Democrats, 
some to the American Farm Bureau Federation, and some to Secretary 
Brannan. Instead of enacting the Brannan Plan, Congress in 1949 once 
again delayed implementation of flexible price supports and extended 
high supports. The next year, war in Korea became an additional ob-
stacle in the path of change in farm policy.  
 Dean does not regard the Brannan Plan as an adequate response 
to the new situation. It was too close to the old program. He appears 
to prefer the policy of flexible price supports, and he notes that the 
Eisenhower administration established a flexible program but that it 
had only a short life. 
 Dean builds his history on a strong research base, taking full ad-
vantage of the riches now available for work on the Truman period. 
He draws together the relevant and abundant scholarly work. That 
includes the basic book on the subject by Allen J. Matusow, Farm Poli-
tics and Policies in the Truman Years, published 40 years ago. Since then, 
many scholars have made contributions to Truman-era historiography, 
but Dean still finds much value in Matusow’s early work. Dean’s book 
also benefits from manuscripts that could not be seen in the 1960s, in-
cluding the Anderson and Brannan papers and important portions of 
Truman’s papers.  
 There is one underdeveloped theme in this good book. That is the 
discussion of the agricultural revolution that Dean regards as the source 
of the need for a change in policy. He refers to it often, but his references 
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are short and scattered. He defines it as technological, but it was more 
than that. It was demographic, too. Technology was replacing people 
in farming. Participants in his story knew that farmers were becoming 
more productive and that that change had implications for policy, but 
they, he suggests, were not really aware that something so big as to be 
labeled a revolution was under way. How far had it progressed? Was 
there much discussion of it in the press, in the congressional commit-
tees, and elsewhere at the time? A discussion of such questions would 
have strengthened the book. A full chapter on the revolution, follow-
ing the introduction, could have been a helpful addition.  
 Even without such a chapter, the book makes a significant contri-
bution on a topic of great importance in Iowa and much importance 
elsewhere as well. 
 
 
Phyllis Schlafly and Grassroots Conservatism: A Woman’s Crusade, by Don-
ald T. Critchlow. Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century America 
Series. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005. xi, 422 pp. Illustra-
tions, notes, index. $29.95 cloth. 
Reviewer Glen Jeansonne is professor of history at the University of Wisconsin–
Milwaukee. His many books and articles on right-wing politics in the twentieth-
century United States include Women of the Far Right: The Mothers’ Movement 
and World War II (1996). 
Some years ago I delivered a paper on Elizabeth Dilling at the Ameri-
can Historical Association’s annual convention. My paper was appro-
priately critical of Dilling, who preferred to fight beside Hitler rather 
than against him. After the paper was applauded, the first questioner 
asked me to compare Dilling to Phyllis Schlafly. I replied that Schlafly 
was a mainstream conservative who worked within the system and 
seldom lost her temper; Dilling belonged to the lunatic fringe, was 
infatuated with conspiracy theories, and described herself as “even-
tempered, mad all the time.” I could not persuade my listeners that 
Schlafly and Dilling were not ideological soulmates. The session 
quickly disintegrated, and I left the room feeling as if I had been exiled 
to the academic equivalent of Siberia.  
 More than a decade later, the stereotype of Schlafly persists in aca-
demia that lumps her with the Ku Klux Klan and the John Birch Society 
and just short of Lizzie Borden. Donald Critchlow’s book is a useful 
corrective. Some people are misled to label Schlafly a fanatic by her 
ferocious drive, powerful energy, and fierce determination. But it is a 
focused, purposeful, controlled drive, although passionate.  
